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Euro area CDS spreads in the crisis:  
The role of open market operations and contagion  
 
1. Introduction 
On 9 August 2007 BNP Paribas announced that it would suspend three of its funds because problems 
in the US subprime market prevented their proper valuation. The financial crisis that followed 
spread from subprime funds to money markets, triggering on 15 September 2008 the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers, and from there to international bank and government bond markets. The euro 
area debt crisis first affected Greece, which sought its initial bailout from the IMF/European 
Commission/ECB-Troika in May 2010; a second bailout followed in July 2011. Ireland received 
assistance in November 2010, and Portugal in May 2011, and Spain the promise of support if 
requested in June 2012. 
The European Central Bank responded to the crisis by slashing interest rates from October 2008 
onwards and by offering more liquidity to market participants through its standard auctions of 
repurchase agreements (repos). It then changed the conditions under which liquidity was made 
available, by extending the contract length of some of the repo operations and by adopting full 
allotment. Lengthening contracts was a first step towards more permanent liquidity provision. 
From the middle of 2009 onwards, the ECB engaged in outright purchases, thus providing permanent 
funds to market participants. Initially, the ECB bought covered bonds when the transmission of  
policy rate changes to market rates seemed impaired. The first Covered Bond Purchase Programme 
(CBPP) lasted from June 2009 to June 2010. When the sovereign debt crisis spread, the ECB decided 
in May 2010 to purchase government bonds alongside private debt under the Securities Market 
Programme (SMP). Covered bonds purchases have been made again under a second Covered Bond 
Purchase Programme (CBPP2) since November 2011. Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) were 
announced in September 2012 (though at the time of writing no actual purchases have been made 
under this scheme). Their introduction marked the end of the SMP. 
A number of papers have examined the impact of the liquidity provision through repos and related 
temporary transactions money market interest rates.1 A second strand of the literature has studied 
the impact of asset purchase programmes on longer-term government bond yields.2 Thus, papers 
tend to focus on one type of measure and on the effect on the borrowing costs of either banks or 
governments. 
In this paper, we look simultaneously at the response of commercial bank and sovereign CDS 
spreads to allow for direct comparisons. We do so using five-year credit default swap spreads, which 
                                                          
1  See Čihák et al. (2009) on long-term ECB repos, McAndrews et al. (2008), Wu (2008) and Taylor and Williams (2009) for 
the Federal Reserve and Aït-Sahalia et al. (2012), Frank and Hesse (2009), IMF (2009) and Gerlach-Kristen and Kugler 
(2012) for international comparisons. 
2  See Stroebel and Taylor (2009) the effectiveness of the Fed’s purchase of mortgage-backed securities and Gagnon et al. 
(2011), Bauer and Rudebusch (2011) and Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) its Large-Scale Asset Purchases. 
Meier (2009), Joyce et al. (2010) and Daines et al. (2012) study the impact of quantitative easing in the UK. IMF (2010) 
compares the effect of asset purchase programmes in the US, the UK and the Euro area, and Meaning and Zhu (2011) 
study the impact in the US and the UK. 
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are readily available for bank and government debt. We concentrate on the CDS spreads of 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain, and of two commercial banks from each of 
these countries. These spreads are related to market participants’ expectations as to how likely it is 
that a commercial bank or a government will default on its loans. A high CDS spread thus reflects 
that markets believe that a debtor is in serious difficulties. A further advantage of CDS spreads is 
that, in contrast to government bond yields, there is no direct flight-to-safety effect. If investors 
decide that the default probability of, say, Ireland increases, the Irish sovereign CDS spread and the 
bond yield rise. At the same time, investors that have sold Irish bonds are looking for a substitute 
asset to invest in and are likely to turn to a safer, e.g. German, bond. German bond yields decline as 
a consequence. German CDS spreads, by contrast, remain largely unaffected. 3 
Using CDS data, we ask two broad sets of questions. The first concerns the impact of ECB open 
market operations on spreads. How successful have they been in reducing market stress? Are repos, 
which are temporary liquidity injections, more or less successful than asset purchases, which inject 
liquidity permanently? What features of the repos matter: volume, contract length, or settlement 
speed? How important were the announcements of the asset purchase programmes?  
The second set of questions revolves around contagion. Do commercial bank CDS spreads respond 
to one another? We examine whether the CDS spread of one bank responds to those from the 
previous day of the other banks in our data set, controlling for open market operations and other 
measures of market stress and rescue operations. Do commercial bank spreads react if the market 
believes the default probability of sovereigns has increased? Is contagion from the own sovereign 
particularly large? And we ask the same questions for sovereigns: is there contagion between them, 
is there contagion from commercial banks, and do domestic banks have a particularly large impact?  
Our main findings are that early in the crisis, repos indeed reduced commercial bank CDS spreads. In 
particular, large volumes that were transferred fast seemed to reduce stress during the liquidity 
crisis. Later on, the announcement of the Securities Market Programme drove down spreads of both 
banks and sovereigns. Regarding contagion, there is ample evidence of contagion among banks. 
Sovereign spreads tend to influence those of both other sovereigns and commercial banks. 
Interestingly, after the onset of the euro crisis sovereign CDS spreads appear to have been immune 
to one another and to bank spreads. It is possible that this reflects ECB bond purchases to prevent 
contagion. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the data. We first discuss how CDS 
spreads over the course of the crisis and then review the ECB open market operations. Section 3 
presents the regression setup.  Section 4 discusses the impact ECB open market operations seem to 
have had on CDS spreads. Section 5 reports the results on contagion. Section 6 concludes. 
 
                                                          
3  CDS data of course have disadvantages, too. First, liquidity was low before the crisis and may have been boosted by 
speculators since then. Second, the European Parliament has restricted the purchase of sovereign CDSs to investors 
who hold the underlying bonds, or closely related bonds, and the introduction of this restriction may have caused 
gyrations in CDS spreads. The restrictions came into force on 1 November 2012 and reduced liquidity in some market 
segments. The estimations therefore end on 1 August 2012. Finally, in the Greek default discussions, a lot of attention 
was given to how triggering CDS payout clauses could be avoided, and this also may have caused swings in CDS 
spreads. 
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2. Data 
2.1  CDS spreads 
We use daily data spanning 1 August 2005 to 1 August 2012. Figure 1 shows in the left panel the CDS 
spreads for twelve commercial banks. We choose two banks per country and concentrate on some 
of the best known. For Germany, we use Commerzbank and Deutsche Bank, for Greece Alpha Bank 
and National Bank of Greece, for Ireland AIB and Bank of Ireland, for Italy Monte dei Paschi di Siena 
and Unicredit, for Portugal Banco Comercial Português and Banco Espírito Santo, and for Spain BBVA 
and Santander. The right panel shows the CDS spreads for the six governments. 
Before the onset of the financial crisis, CDS spreads were low. After the announcement of Paribas’ 
difficulties in August 2007, commercial banks’ CDS spreads started increasing, and they rose further 
after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Then the crisis spread, and from late 2008 onwards, 
government CDS spreads began rising as well. It is notable how closely sovereign and corporate CDS 
spreads are correlated between countries. The exception is Greece, where sovereign CDS spreads 
(plotted on a separate scale) rose much faster than commercial bank CDS spreads after March 2011. 
In the analysis below, we use the CDS spreads in levels. While tests do not reject the hypothesis of a 
standard root, we accommodate potential unit root behaviour by estimating simple level equations 
that include lags of the dependent variable. We hence allow for a random walk process and avoid a 
spurious regression problem. The estimates we thus obtain are consistent, and hypothesis tests have 
standard asymptotic distributions (see Hamilton, 1994, and Sims, Stock and Watson, 1990). 
 
Figure 1: Credit default swap spreads (in basis points) 
Commercial banks Governments 
  
Note: Five-year CDS spreads, in basis points. Data for National Bank of Greece only from November 2008, 
Source: Datastream. 
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2.2 Open market operations 
At the root of the financial crisis lay a realisation on part of investors that risks had been 
underestimated, causing liquidity to dry up in a variety of markets. Illiquidity in many cases was seen 
as signalling potential insolvency, and CDS spreads reflected this. Central banks tried to ease liquidity 
squeezes by stepping in as provider of funds where counterparties had withdrawn. 
For the euro zone, banks’ need for liquidity can be gauged from the information on the ECB’s open 
market operations. Figure 2 shows in the left panel the number of bidders in the repo auctions. 
Participation numbers almost doubled in the fall of 2008 but have since fallen below pre-crisis level. 
A large number of banks also submitted bids in the long-term repo operations in late 2011 and early 
2012.  
 
Figure 2: Bidding behaviour 
  
Note: Euro repo auctions only. Amounts in million euros. Source: ECB website 
 
The right plot of the same figure shows the sum of the bids submitted (in blue) and the liquidity 
allotted by the ECB (in red). Before the fall of 2008, the ECB tended to allot liquidity amounting to 
about three quarters of the bids it received. Liquidity provision reflected the ECB’s internal 
assessment of liquidity needs in the markets. In September 2008, the sum of bids increased sharply, 
and in October the ECB switched to a fixed-rate full-allotment (FRFA) policy. This policy change 
meant that repo demand was fully accommodated and that variable-rate tenders gave way to fixed-
rate tenders.4  
                                                          
4  The ECB had originally offered liquidity at the same rate for all auction participants, pro rata. However, banks tended to 
bid for very large amounts, presumably to cut competitors off from their access to liquidity. The ECB therefore 
switched in mid-2000 to a variable-rate procedure, which implied that banks had to pay high interest if they wanted to 
secure a large amount of liquidity. The marginal interest rate, which captures what the last bank whose demand the 
ECB meets pays in interest, lay on average 4.5 basis points above the minimum bid rate between June 2000 and 
September 2008. On 8 October, it rose to 111 basis points above the minimum bid rate, indicating that banks were 
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Figure 3: Repo supply 
  
  
Note: Liquidity outstanding counts euro repo auctions only, securities held are securities of euro area residents 
denominated in euro. Source: ECB website, author’s calculations. 
 
 
Figure 3 provides details on the repos. Liquidity provision through repos, in the top left panel, 
increased in several steps.5 There was a first rise at the end of 2007, when worries about end-of-the-
year effects in commercial banks’ balance sheets were widespread. The ECB raised the amount of 
liquidity outstanding after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. Since that October, 
the FRFA policy has meant that how much liquidity is made available is determined by banks’ 
demand. There was a decline in outstanding liquidity in mid-2010, but since the second half of 2011, 
it has increased sharply and beyond levels seen before. This rise may be related to banks’ 
unwillingness to lend across intra-euro zone borders, which has further added to the ECB’s role as 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
urgently looking for liquidity. The ECB only once returned to a variable-rate tender (on 28 April 2010, when there were 
hopes that the financial crisis was coming to an end), but then immediately reverted to full allotment. 
5  We show only liquidity provided through repos and in euros. We record a change in liquidity on the day of settlement 
of the repo, not on the day of the auction (preliminary regressions suggested the settlement date performed better), 
and we do not deduct the liquidity parked in ECB deposits, since deposits follow a pattern that depends on 
maintenance periods and complicate the picture.  
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7 
intermediary. The rise in commercial banks’ deposits with the ECB, which passed 1 trillion euros in 
the first quarter of 2012, supports this notion. 
A comparison of the outstanding liquidity and the length for which the ECB offers funds to 
commercial banks, shown in the top right graph, suggests that when repos were offered over a long 
period demand was particularly high. Before the crisis, the ECB offered funds for typically two weeks 
and three months. Since 2008, it has repeatedly lengthened the duration of its repo contracts. The 
longest contract has been three years.6 
The bottom left panel shows that repo auctions were typically settled after one day, though there 
were quite a number of fast tenders in 2007 and 2008.7 The demand-supply gap, shown in the 
bottom right panel as percentage of demand, started increasing when the crisis began (see also 
Gerlach-Kristen and Kugler, 2012). This indicates that supply did not keep up with demand. The gap 
closed on 8 October 2008, when the ECB adopted the FRFA policy.  
 
Figure 4: Asset purchases 
 
Note: CBPP volumes from the ECB’s liquidity analysis, SMP volumes constructed from ECB sterilisation 
announcements. Source: ECB website. 
 
Turning from the temporary liquidity provision to the ECB’s outright asset purchases, we show in 
Figure 4 the securities purchased under the Covered Bond Purchase Programmes (CBPP) and the 
                                                          
6  It should be noted that there sometimes were several auctions on one day. For those cases, we compute the length of 
the repo contracts for that day (and any other non-volume variables) as weighted average, with the weights given by 
the volumes of the different repo auctions. For those days when the ECB did not conduct repo operations, we use the 
lagged value for those variables. We also estimated the model using only data from repo auction days. The results were 
similar to those provided in the text. 
7  We do not distinguish between fast and standard tenders. Preliminary regressions showed this difference to be 
unimportant. 
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Securities Market Programme (SMP). The first CBPP ran from 4 June 2009 to 30 June 2010, the SMP 
from 10 May 2010 to 6 September 2012, and CBPP2 began on 3 November 2011. The CBPP volumes 
are from the ECB’s daily liquidity analysis, while the size of the SMP purchases is taken from the ECB 
announcements on the resulting sterilising operations, which are made weekly. All these data are 
available from the ECB’s website. 
2.3 Contagion  
To examine the role of contagion, we study the interaction between CDS spreads. Since there are 
eighteen different spreads in our sample, we refrain from including them all individually in the 
regressions. Instead, we construct summary measures.  
There are three hypotheses we would like to test. First, we want to test for existence of contagion 
within a group (i.e. among commercial banks and among sovereigns). To do so, we proceed as 
follows. For Commerzbank, the first commercial bank in our sample, we construct a summary 
measure of all other commercial bank CDS spreads. This measure is given by the first principal 
component of all commercial bank CDS spreads apart from that of Commerzbank.8 We include the 
lagged value of this measure in the regression for the Commerzbank spread. This allows us to assess 
whether a common movement in the other banks’ CDS spreads on the previous day impacts on the 
Commerzbank spread today. To test for within-sovereign contagion, we construct e.g. for Germany 
the first principal component of the other five sovereign spreads and use the lagged value of this 
variable in the regression. 
Second, we would like to examine if there was contagion between groups. I.e., if commercial bank 
CDS spreads increase, does that cause a rise in sovereign spreads the following day? To test this 
hypothesis, we construct one principal component of all commercial bank spreads and another first 
principal component from all sovereign CDS spreads. The lag of the commercial bank principal 
component is then included in the regression for the different sovereign CDS spreads. If we find a 
significant positive impact in e.g. the German equation, this suggests that the German CDS spread 
tends to rise if perceived default risk increases in the banking sector. Correspondingly, the lagged 
sovereign principal component is included in the individual commercial bank regressions, and a 
significant coefficient would indicate that sovereign default risk raises the same risk of individual 
banks. 
Third, we would like to test whether contagion within a country is stronger than across borders. To 
test for domestic contagion, we include in the Commerzbank and Deutsche Bank regressions the 
lagged German CDS spread, and in the regression for Germany the lagged spreads of both 
Commerzbank and Deutsche Bank. If we identify a significant positive impact, this implies that 
domestic contagion is particularly strong and detectable beyond the common movements identified 
by the first principal component. 
 
                                                          
8  We construct the loadings for the principal components using the correlation, rather than the covariance, matrix of the 
different CDS spreads. This avoids attaching a dominating weight on the most volatile CDS spreads (i.e. Greece). We 
ensure that the loadings are normalised such that the first principal component increases in times of market stress. 
9 
2.4 Other explanatory variables 
To account for other forces that drive CDS spreads, we include a number of controls in our 
regressions. The first of these are ECB interest rates. Figure 5 shows the policy rate and the marginal 
rate.  
The policy rate is set by the Governing Council and affects a commercial bank’s default probabilities 
positively or negatively, depending on the bank’s interest-rate exposure and hedging. The policy rate 
was moreover the minimum bid rate for auctions that were conducted under flexible-rate tenders. 
The marginal rate was determined mechanically as the rate payable by the last bank whose bid the 
ECB accepted. When the ECB adopted full allotment, the policy rate became the repo rate for all 
banks partaking in the auction.  
 
Figure 5: ECB interest rates (in %) 
 
 
Source: ECB website 
 
To capture the rescue packages granted to Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain, we construct a series 
of bailout dummies that take the value of unity the day a Troika bailout was agreed and thereafter. 
For Greece, this variable takes the value 2 after the second bailout. The default dummy is set to 
unity after the Greek sovereign CDS spread reached 10,000 basis points. We also include a dummy 
for the nationalisation of Anglo Irish Bank on 15 January 2009, which pushed Irish government 
finances into turmoil. This might be reflected in the Irish sovereign CDS spread.  
We capture calendar effects using an end-of-quarter dummy, general market volatility using the VIX, 
and any other euro-area developments not reflected in the previous variables using the euro-dollar 
exchange rate. Any further influences on the CDS spreads, and there are certainly many, are 
subsumed in the residual. We estimate our equations in systems to allow for the fact that shocks 
may be correlated across banks and sovereigns. We now turn to the estimation. 
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3. Regression setup 
In this section we present the regression setup. Sections 4 and 5 discuss the estimates by topic, 
focussing first on the ECB’s open market operations and then on contagion. We model CDS spreads 
in two systems of equations. For commercial CDS spreads we fit for each bank 
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The first two terms capture the autoregressive component of the CDS spreads and account for 
potential unit root behaviour. 
The next block of variables captures the ECB open market operations. We first include variables on 
the liquidity provision through repos, starting with the outstanding repo liquidity today and 
yesterday. We include the lag because it might be either the stock or the flow of this variable that 
affects CDS spreads. Besides the repo volume, we also analyse whether the length of the contract 
helped reduce financial stress, the settlement speed and the demand-supply gap.9 Next follow 
variables covering the ECB’s purchases. We include a dummy that takes the value of unity on the day 
a programme was announced (and -1 when the CBPP was stopped), and two variables recording the 
total volumes of assets bought under the two programmes. Again, we include the current value as 
well as the lag to account for the possibility that it is the flow, rather than the stock, of purchases 
that matters. While the CBPP data are available daily, the SMP data are weekly basis. We therefore 
use as lag of five working days for the SMP.  
The next block of variables captures contagion. We first control for contagion between commercial 
banks. To do so, we construct the first principal component of the CDS spreads of all commercial 
banks but the one studied and include this in the regression. The next variable is the first principal 
                                                          
9  In early regressions, we also included dummies for those days on which the collateral rules were changed. However, 
they were almost always insignificant, and we have therefore excluded them. 
11 
component of all sovereign CDS spreads. If doubts about government finances affect commercial 
banks’ outlook, as they might well if a bank holds government bonds, this variable should be 
significant. To account for the possibility that the own sovereign is particularly important, be this 
because the bank is biased towards domestic government bonds or because the state’s capacity for 
support matters for a bank’s CDS spread, we include the domestic sovereign CDS spread as a 
separate variable. We lag the variables capturing contagion to avoid simultaneity. 
Finally, there are other controls. The first of these are ECB interest rates. It is not clear what effect 
they should have on CDS spreads.10 Bailout, default and the Anglo dummies should in principle 
reduce market stress and thus bring down spreads. However, if the measures threaten the finances 
of the rescuers, there might be the opposite effect for some of the sovereign CDS spreads. The 
quarter dummy might increase some bank spreads, and the VIX should generally be associated with 
higher spreads. The dollar exchange rate, finally, is defined as EUR/USD, so that an increase captures 
a depreciation of the euro. To the extent that depreciation helps restore competitiveness, a rise in 
the exchange rate should be correlated with falling sovereign spreads. Note that we lag the 
exchange rate and the VIX to avoid simultaneity.  
We estimate the CDS spread equation simultaneously for all twelve commercial banks using 
seemingly unrelated regression techniques. 11 This approach lets us take advantage of the fact that 
banks’ CDS spreads probably were exposed to much the same shocks. 
We estimate essentially the same regression for sovereign CDS spreads,  
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10  On the one hand, higher interest rates make the situation for borrowers such as commercial banks and governments 
more expensive. On the other hand, banks are lenders as well and might benefit from higher rates. Since the impact of 
interest rates is not the focus of this paper, the ambiguity of the expected sign on interest rates does not matter for the 
main analysis. 
11  We do not impose equality constraints across equations since preliminary tests tended to reject. 
12 
The only difference is that for contagion, we include the two first principal components of all other 
sovereigns and of all commercial banks, as well as the CDS spreads of the two domestic banks. 
Again, the inclusion of the latter accounts for the possibility of especially strong spill-overs within a 
country. 
In the estimation, we use daily week-day data and consider four subsamples, to allow for the 
possibility that CDS spreads responded differently to different measures and events over time. The 
first is the pre-crisis sample, runs from 1 August 2005 to 8 August 2007, the day before the Paribas 
announcement. The Paribas phase ends on 12 September 2008. Lehman Brothers collapsed on 15 
September 2008, and the Lehman phase covers data up to 21 April 2010. The next day, the Greek 
CDS spread crossed 500 basis points, and we choose this as the onset of the euro-area debt crisis. 
Tables 1 to 4 present the results for these four subsamples for commercial bank CDS spreads, Tables 
5 to 8 show the results for sovereign spreads. In discussing the results, we first concentrate on the 
effect of open market operations and then turn to the issue of contagion. Within each of these 
sections, we discuss commercial bank CDS spreads and sovereign spreads in turn. 
 
4. ECB open market operations and CDS spreads 
This section examines how the ECB’s open market operations reduced market pressure as captured 
by CDS spreads. Given the degree of detail the ECB publishes on its operations, we are able to ask 
quite detailed questions, such as the following. Did the repo auctions mainly improve commercial 
banks’ financial situation, who are the ECB’s counterparties in the tenders, or was there also an 
indirect impact on sovereign CDS spreads? Did it matter for how long liquidity was provided for, and 
how fast? How did asset purchases help? Were the CBPPs or the SMP more effective in driving down 
spreads? 
One important issue in this analysis is endogeneity. After all, the ECB is likely to increase liquidity 
supply when CDS spreads rise. The analysis addresses this issue in two ways. First, the CDS spreads 
used in the estimation were recorded at the end of the trading day, i.e. after the open market 
operations. The ECB operations thus were not based on the CDS values recorded for that day. 
Second, we include lagged values in the analysis. Obviously, the ECB’s operations reflected the 
general level of market stress in a particular period, so that there is a longer-run link between the 
operations and the CDS spreads. The presence of lags in the analysis allows for a long-run 
relationship between the level of CDS spreads and the volume of open market operations. From this 
perspective, our regressions can be thought of as reformulated error-correction equations. 
Another issue that must be mentioned is that for the temporary open market operations, only 
commercial banks, but not sovereigns, were ECB counterparties. Therefore, if we detect and impact 
of repo auctions on sovereign CDS spreads, this captures an indirect effect stemming from changes 
in the health of the financial sector. The same is true for purchases under the CBPP. By contrast, the 
SMP had a direct impact on sovereign CDS spreads, since under this programme also government 
bonds were bought. Presumably, these operations should affect the discount at which new 
government debt is issued. 
With these qualifications in mind, we now turn to analysing the regression output. 
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Table 1: Impact on commercial bank CDS spreads, pre-crisis phase (1 August 2005 to 8 August 2007) 
 
Commerz-
bank 
Deutsche 
Bank 
Alpha 
Bank 
National 
Bank of 
Greece 
AIB Bank of Ireland 
Monte dei 
Paschi di 
Siena 
Unicredit 
Banco 
Comercial 
Português 
Banco 
Espírito 
Santo 
BBVA Santander 
AR1 0.583*** 0.663***   0.788*** 0.763*** 0.711*** 0.703*** 0.378***  0.670*** 0.711*** 
AR2 0.184*** 0.258***   0.016 0.167*** 0.153*** 0.123*** 0.156***  0.151*** 0.138*** 
ECB open market operations 
Repo 0.011 0.008   -0.008 -0.002 -0.005 0.003 -0.017**  0.002 0.003 
Repo-1 -0.012 -0.006   0.009 0.002 0.005 -0.006 0.010  0.002 0.003 
Length 0.017** 0.010**   0.002 -0.000 0.006* 0.004 0.002  0.004 0.003 
Settle 0.112 -0.096   -0.195 0.032 0.039 0.245 0.200  0.164 0.213 
dsg -0.005 0.009   0.012 0.006 0.006 0.002 -0.002  0.002 -0.001 
Contagion 
pcBanks 15.707*** 0.445   7.967*** 3.221*** 6.670*** 7.537*** 23.706***  6.819*** 5.176*** 
pcSovs -0.181 -0.066   -9.762*** -2.684 -0.031 -0.092 -0.547**  -0.330 -0.303 
ownSov 0.142 -0.008   0.017*** 0.005 0.024 0.163*** -0.119***  -0.012 -0.012 
Other controls 
Prate 3.321* 2.863**   1.032 0.210 1.469 1.380 0.164  1.301* 0.537 
Mrate -2.858 -2.512*   -0.810 0.050 -1.697* -0.858 -0.312  -0.946 -0.346 
Quarter -0.554 0.004   -0.081 0.034 0.138 0.196 0.302  0.027 -0.046 
VIX-1 0.752*** 0.473***   0.169*** 0.160*** 0.371*** 0.323*** 0.166***  0.262*** 0.309*** 
VIX-2 -0.635*** -0.318***   -0.129*** -0.128*** -0.287*** -0.272*** -0.141***  -0.214*** -0.228*** 
USD-1 -19.118 -3.579   -2.493 2.566 2.033 0.718 7.821  -3.048 1.471 
USD-2 11.746 -1.167   3.344 -3.325 -3.426 -2.756 -6.585  2.378 -2.610 
Adj R2 0.900 0.900   0.943 0.958 0.963 0.935 0.961  0.950 0.944 
Note: 527 observations, SUR estimates. Impact of open market operations per billion euro. No data available to Alpha Bank, National Bank of Greece and Banco Espírito 
Santo. */**/*** denotes significance at the 10/5/1 percent level. 
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Table 2: Impact on commercial bank CDS spreads, Paribas phase (9 August 2007 to 12 September 2008) 
 
Commerz-
bank 
Deutsche 
Bank 
Alpha 
Bank 
National 
Bank of 
Greece 
AIB Bank of Ireland 
Monte dei 
Paschi di 
Siena 
Unicredit 
Banco 
Comercial 
Português 
Banco 
Espírito 
Santo 
BBVA Santander 
AR1 0.785*** 0.860*** 0.607***  0.907*** 0.911*** 0.773*** 0.828*** 0.816*** 0.804*** 0.611*** 0.690*** 
AR2 0.126*** 0.064* 0.073  0.047 0.029 0.001 0.081** -0.012 -0.030 0.079*** 0.004 
ECB open market operations 
Repo -0.018 -0.013 -0.051  -0.010 -0.002 -0.004 -0.011 -0.017* -0.003 -0.019* -0.013 
Repo-1 0.006 0.005 0.135***  0.010 0.011 -0.000 0.003 0.007 0.008 0.010 0.010 
Length 0.022* 0.017 NA  -0.001 -0.021 0.006 0.020 0.010 -0.007 0.007 0.013 
Settle -3.038** -1.171 -0.000  -1.200 0.341 -1.260 -0.552 -0.520 -1.312 -0.531 0.389 
Dsg -0.032 -0.008 0.035  -0.058** -0.021 0.003 0.012 -0.007 0.007 0.009 0.004 
Contagion 
pcBanks 0.910 -0.763 12.375**  7.100*** 8.779*** 7.989*** 0.121 6.332*** 6.406* 9.833*** 10.100*** 
pcSovs 13.383*** 11.694*** -10.411  -10.613 -22.319** 8.262** 8.791* 12.171*** 18.119** 22.379*** 16.545*** 
ownSov -0.449** -0.302 -1.166**  0.024 0.056* -0.005 -0.018 -0.016 0.108 -0.190** -0.105 
Other controls 
Prate -9.860** -3.989 0.530  11.223** 17.270** -11.135*** -3.459 0.111 2.257 -0.140 3.381 
Mrate -2.466 -3.130 -0.621  0.360 3.347 -1.682 -4.629** -2.236 1.355 -2.909 -3.760* 
Quarter 1.816 1.651 2.626  1.848 1.646 2.899 2.153 1.315 3.006 2.566 2.540 
VIX-1 1.148*** 1.083*** 0.054  0.812*** 0.858*** 0.886*** 1.065*** 0.826*** 0.919*** 0.887*** 1.006*** 
VIX-2 -1.159*** -1.042*** -0.324  -0.926*** -0.979*** -0.939*** -1.051*** -0.843*** -1.226*** -0.859*** -0.919*** 
USD-1 -11.772 16.153 97.785*  -9.695 58.149 -28.318 0.387 3.766 47.788 7.933 -0.202 
USD-2 -1.261 -23.138 -98.333  -3.710 -68.764 20.556 -6.548 -22.984 -56.313 -20.012 -14.859 
Adj R2 0.960 0.959 0.915  0.986 0.987 0.970 0.951 0.975 0.958 0.969 0.970 
Note: 287 observations (61 for Alpha Bank, 104 for Banco Espírito Santo), SUR estimates. Impact of open market operations per billion euro. No data available to National 
Bank of Greece. */**/*** denotes significance at the 10/5/1 percent level. 
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Table 3: Impact on commercial bank CDS spreads, Lehman phase (15 September 2008 to 21 April 2010) 
 
Commerz-
bank 
Deutsche 
Bank 
Alpha 
Bank 
National 
Bank of 
Greece 
AIB Bank of Ireland 
Monte dei 
Paschi di 
Siena 
Unicredit 
Banco 
Comercial 
Português 
Banco 
Espírito 
Santo 
BBVA Santander 
AR1 0.711*** 0.836*** 0.887***  0.916*** 0.908*** 0.766*** 0.735*** 0.867*** 0.986*** 0.801*** 0.799*** 
AR2 0.159*** 0.045 0.039  0.032 0.025 0.126*** 0.101*** 0.001 -0.088** 0.099*** 0.057* 
ECB open market operations 
Repo 0.027** 0.042** 0.012  0.002 0.001 0.015 -0.031** -0.004 -0.004 0.004 0.000 
Repo-1 -0.031*** -0.395** -0.036  -0.039 -0.036 -0.022** 0.011 -0.008 -0.011 -0.014 -0.012 
Length 0.000 0.001 0.006  -0.005 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.002 
Settle 3.605* 7.995*** 5.466  11.238** 13.793** 4.466** 9.155*** 4.437* 2.517 3.033 2.424 
Dsg 0.154* 0.306*** -0.039  0.572*** 0.474** 0.273*** 0.061 0.197** 0.245*** 0.210*** 0.183** 
CBBP_ann 0.503 -1.027 -3.180  -7.191 -4.991 0.186 1.120 6.823 0.741 0.041 -2.397 
CBPP -2.052 -0.871 -5.657  1.746 1.291 -0.789 -0.804 -1.950 -0.185 -1.275 -1.487 
CBPP-1 1.927 0.800 5.703  -2.108 -1.816 0.773 0.707 1.924 0.132 1.290 1.500 
Contagion 
pcBanks 1.617 0.547 0.015  -5.923 -1.693 -4.086*** 0.383 1.074 -1.043 -1.568 -0.585 
pcSovs 1.254 0.511 10.382**  18.919*** 21.548*** 5.186*** 9.321*** -1.004 1.457 2.228* 2.075 
ownSov -0.051 0.038 0.065  -0.047*** -0.071*** 0.027* -0.010 0.126*** 0.088*** 0.050** 0.074*** 
Other controls 
Prate 7.589 40.061*** 11.359  -2.102 -3.281 11.296* 14.878* 7.116 11.245* 12.599** 8.331 
Mrate -8.605 -39.909*** -7.414  -2.597 2.693 -12.634** -14.167* -8.012 -12.781** -13.516** -8.485 
Anglo -10.603* -11.355* 27.127  -21.451 -17.818 -7.742 -11.944 -9.153 -14.819** -11.725** -13.328** 
Quarter 2.922 5.599** 1.202  4.450 4.692 -0.454 -1.747 -0.003 0.489 -1.954 -2.227 
VIX-1 0.253** 0.499*** -0.574  0.646*** 0.194 0.494*** 0.395*** 0.371*** 0.530*** 0.512*** 0.525*** 
VIX-2 -0.372*** -0.499*** 0.510  -0.636*** -0.504* -0.450*** -0.364*** -0.443*** -0.615*** -0.511*** -0.528*** 
USD-1 -30.318 -57.963** -31.920  -54.220 -87.810 -48.107* -77.997** -12.289 -38.072 -39.750 -30.350 
USD-2 6.511 49.128* 3.486  59.630 96.698 42.352 88.574*** 0.822 30.952 26.650 19.952 
Adj R2 0.929 0.920 0.983  0.986 0.986 0.942 0.956 0.966 0.969 0.945 0.937 
Note: 418 observations, SUR estimates. Impact of open market operations per billion euro. No data available to National Bank of Greece. */**/*** denotes significance at 
the 10/5/1 percent level. 
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Table 4: Impact on commercial bank CDS spreads, euro-crisis phase (22 April 2010 to 1 August 2012) 
 
Commerz-
bank 
Deutsche 
Bank Alpha Bank 
National 
Bank of 
Greece 
AIB Bank of Ireland 
Monte dei 
Paschi di 
Siena 
Unicredit 
Banco 
Comercial 
Português 
Banco 
Espírito 
Santo 
BBVA Santander 
AR1 0.883*** 0.884*** 0.676*** 0.571*** 1.025*** 0.846*** 0.926*** 0.937*** 0.991*** 1.051*** 0.844*** 0.834*** 
AR2 -0.005 -0.051* 0.246*** 0.273*** -0.075* 0.041 0.026 -0.022 -0.067* -0.127*** -0.049* -0.030 
ECB open market operations 
Repo -0.013 -0.006 0.165 -0.329*** 0.014 0.033 -0.027 -0.015 0.002 0.007 0.016 0.007 
Repo-1 0.021 0.013 -0.188* 0.290** 0.001 -0.052 0.025 0.012 -0.027 -0.012 0.005 0.010 
Length -0.004 -0.004 -0.000 0.042** -0.002 0.006 -0.008 -0.007 0.002 -0.004 -0.006 -0.007* 
Settle -2.781 -1.499 4.535 13.228 -1.001 -5.644 -3.120 -2.065 2.831 0.227 -3.149 -2.437 
CBPP_ann 3.701 1.648 -27.992 36.297 -1.699 -20.487 6.545 0.998 -4.681 5.937 -4.034 0.853 
CBPP2_ann -13.115 2.123 -97.631* -7.720 2.749 1.768 -18.520 -17.391 7.360 -3.615 -10.820 -7.758 
CBPP -3.414 -3.916 -21.107 17.936 6.692 9.158 -6.457 -8.270 -22.061* -8.657 -5.601 -5.234 
CBPP-1 2.952 2.662 17.769 -22.471 -6.128 -7.373 5.951 7.596 19.661* 7.498 5.313 4.351 
SMP_ann -36.355*** -52.270*** -202.273*** -6.859 -83.376** -88.813* -80.242*** 28.792** -159.184*** -149.846*** -81.293*** -83.038*** 
SMP -0.040 0.156 0.624 1.114 0.153 -0.001 -0.066 0.170 0.684 0.399 -0.051 -0.137 
SMP-5 0.044 -0.099 -0.115 -0.096 -0.130 -0.725 0.030 -0.151 -0.559 -0.414 0.039 0.146 
Contagion 
pcBanks 4.303*** 2.440*** 6.910 -10.063* 3.230 15.722*** 2.131 4.378*** 3.761 -0.219 6.868*** 6.030*** 
pcSovs -3.407** -1.115 12.833* 37.909*** -2.990 -10.301 -5.749** -5.452*** 9.465* 8.679** -5.690*** -4.661*** 
ownSov 0.151*** -0.024 -0.004 -0.001 0.024 0.074 0.072*** 0.084*** 0.009 0.005 0.092*** 0.078*** 
Other controls 
Prate 6.926 0.200 -1.776 36.479 26.209 -14.106 0.101 3.782 -12.221 -14.332 6.499 -0.891 
Bailout GR 4.354 1.988 -11.215 -8.979 3.862 36.516** 8.457* 3.221 -0.995 -4.526 1.410 3.326 
Bailout PT -0.696 -3.617** -19.768* -2.518 28.283*** 29.944** 2.335 -2.504 2.902 12.331** -1.070 2.650 
Bailout IE 0.808 -0.624 24.125 41.028*** -13.052 57.999*** 4.372 2.915 1.851 3.990 0.511 0.594 
Bailout SP -0.623 2.354 24.547 13.606 -6.315 -5.336 5.807 -0.974 3.175 1.179 -9.439** -4.132 
Default GR 4.812 3.329 19.043 -27.645 -6.608 -19.105 10.777** 10.248** -2.004 -3.535 8.544** 8.625** 
Quarter -4.565 -3.088 6.658 8.057 -25.714** -9.927 -7.800 -5.243 1.949 2.592 -6.323 -5.928 
VIX-1 0.485** 0.574*** -0.254 2.029* -1.284* -1.604 0.578* 0.674** 0.338 0.635 0.404 0.405 
VIX-2 -0.685*** -0.324** 0.162 -1.899 0.399 0.699 -0.820** -1.006*** 0.072 -0.551 -0.535** -0.438* 
USD-1 -125.002*** -98.461*** -609.216** 162.230 -214.672 -98.670 -242.973*** -155.125** -247.369* -201.359** -108.661* -95.874* 
USD-2 132.710*** 100.118*** 545.926** -289.929 221.621 262.138 250.195*** 165.296*** 289.394** 213.476** 112.450** 120.681** 
Adj R2 0.982 0.975 0.993 0.994 0.993 0.990 0.993 0.993 0.995 0.992 0.981 0.984 
Note 595 observations (AIB 260), SUR estimates. Impact of open market operations per billion euro. */**/*** denotes significance at the 10/5/1 percent level. 
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ECB operations and commercial bank CDS spreads 
Table 1 shows that before the financial crisis, commercial banks’ CDS spreads did not 
respond clearly to liquidity provision. The CDS spread of Banco Comercial Português is the 
only spread that significantly decreased in response to larger repo volumes. Otherwise, we 
find for the two German banks and Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena an apparent rise in CDS 
spreads when repos were available for longer periods. Before the crisis, the ECB offered 
three-month funds monthly to help banks meet their reserve requirements, and the 
movements in CDS spreads seem to be connected with this.12  
During the Paribas phase, the results shown in Table 2 suggest that increased liquidity 
provision through repos seems to have reduced CDS spreads. We estimate a significant 
negative impact on CDS spreads for Banco Comercial Português and BBVA.13 Once Lehman 
Brothers collapsed, we identify in Table 3 a clear impact of settlement speed and the 
demand-supply gap on commercial bank CDS spreads. Fast settlement tended to drive down 
spreads, which is not surprising given that in this phase money markets had dried up. 
Similarly, CDS spreads apparently declined when the ECB supplied much liquidity relative to 
demand. The impact of large repo volumes per se is unclear.14  
After the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the ECB adopted the CBPP. Neither its 
announcement nor the actual purchases have a significant impact on CDS spreads. By 
contrast, Table 4 shows that the announcement of the SMP apparently reduced spreads 
drastically, by up to 200 basis points. Actual volumes do not appear to matter, though this 
part of the analysis is hampered by the fact that we only have weekly SMP data. Temporary 
open market operations have no clear impact during the euro-crisis phase. 
ECB operations and sovereign CDS spreads 
Turning next to the impact of open market operations on sovereign CDS spreads, we see in 
Table 5 that before the crisis, large repo volumes apparently drove up markets’ belief that 
government finances might be negatively affected in Germany and Italy. This might be 
related to the role of liquidity providers German and Italian banks seem to have had in 
money markets. 
Once the financial crisis began, we find in Table 6 no clear impact of temporary open market 
operations on sovereign CDS spreads anymore. The Italian spread apparently declined in the 
                                                          
12  Perhaps related to this, we find that German bank CDS spreads seemed to rise when the marginal rate was 
close to the policy rate, which happened when the ECB accommodated most of the liquidity demand. It is 
possible that the German banks tended to provide liquidity to others, so that their business model suffered 
when the ECB offered long-term and cheap liquidity. 
13  The coefficient on the lagged repo volume is negative, though insignificant, indicating that it might be the 
flow of liquidity, not the outstanding stock, that affects CDS spreads. We also find a significant lagged 
coefficient for Alpha Bank. 
14  We again find that German spreads apparently increased when much liquidity is offered. By contrast, the CDS 
spread of Unicredit seemed to decline.  
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Paribas phase if the flow of repos was large.15 Of course, government were not a party in the 
repo tenders. What we detect here therefore must be an indirect effect. Presumably, it 
relates to the notion that the ECB’s actions would help stabilise the economy and therefore 
government finances. This indirect impact makes it difficult to interpret some of the findings 
on temporary open market operations. For instance, we find that fast settlement seems to 
have reduced the Irish CDS spread, but to have raised the German spread. After the collapse 
of Lehman Brothers, the only impact temporary open market operations seem to have had 
on sovereigns was on Irish spreads. In Table 7, fast settlement, again, and a small demand-
supply gap appear to have reduced Irish spreads.  
While permanent open market operations also do not involve the government as a 
transaction party, at least under the SMP government bonds were purchased. Since the 
bond price rises and yields falls when the ECB government bonds and since primary auction 
participants take account of such market signals, it should be expected that sovereign CDS 
spreads declined after SMP purchases. Also, the announcement of programmes might 
reduce spreads.  
Table 7 shows that in the Lehman phase, the announcement of the first CBPP has no 
significant effect on sovereign CDS spreads. We find that a large flow of purchases seems to 
have helped drive down the Spanish CDS spread.16 When the SMP was announced, we find 
in Table 8 again a massive drop in spreads. The announcement of CBPP2 does not seem to 
have had any impact. Last settlement seems to have raised CDS spreads in Greece and Spain, 
which may indicate that markets took speedy liquidity provision as a crisis sign.  
 
                                                          
15  We find the same signs for Ireland, though only the lagged repo volume is significant. 
16  Interestingly, these coefficients are rather large. An additional one million of purchases under the CBPP 
apparently lowered Spanish spreads by 4.2 basis points. For comparison, the effect of an additional million 
provided through repos seems to have lowered Italian CDS spreads in the Paribas phase by a mere 0.004 
basis points. 
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Table 5: Impact on sovereign CDS spreads, pre-crisis phase (1 August 2005 to 8 August 2007) 
 Germany Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain 
AR1 0.565*** 0.672*** 0.714*** 0.834*** 0.600*** 0.676*** 
AR2 0.245*** 0.250*** 0.096** 0.094** 0.314*** -0.150*** 
ECB open market operations 
Repo 0.004* 0.004 -0.199 0.006** 0.005 0.003 
Repo-1 -0.003 0.001 -0.264 -0.003 -0.002 0.005 
Length 0.001 0.001 0.087 0.001 -0.002 -0.007* 
Settle 0.027 -0.178 5.500 -0.128 0.154 -3.299*** 
Dsg 0.005** -0.001 0.199 0.000 -0.001 0.013 
Contagion 
pcSovs 0.035 -0.069 56.980 -0.137 -0.197* 0.420 
pcBanks -1.532 0.267 17.418 1.479 0.729 2.016 
ownBank1 0.017 NA -0.846 -0.045*** -0.006 0.022 
ownBank2 0.006 NA -0.011 0.015 NA -0.033 
Other controls 
Prate 0.438* -0.002 49.200 0.007 -0.724** -1.170 
Mrate -0.470* -0.379 -36.385 -0.467* 0.541* 0.967 
Quarter 0.034 -0.146 79.379*** 0.157 0.234* 2.300*** 
VIX-1 0.008 0.004 1.491 0.039*** 0.046*** 0.026 
VIX-2 -0.013 0.003 -0.295 -0.023* -0.037** -0.079 
USD-1 -2.653 0.626 223.931 3.733* 4.722* 2.406 
USD-2 3.246* -0.821 -259.135 -2.485 -5.033* 4.842 
Adj R2 0.679 0.982 0.704 0.972 0.953 0.595 
Note: 527 observations, SUR estimates. Impact of open market operations per billion euro. */**/*** 
denotes significance at the 10/5/1 percent level. 
 
 
Table 6: Impact on sovereign CDS spreads, Paribas phase (9 August 2007 to 12 September 2008) 
 Germany Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain 
AR1 0.928*** 0.524*** 0.482*** 0.952*** 0.720*** 0.707*** 
AR2 -0.058 0.310*** 0.220*** 0.003 0.038 0.082 
ECB open market operations 
Repo 0.000 0.009 -0.057 -0.004* -0.001 0.001 
Repo-1 0.000 0.003 0.065* 0.006** 0.001 0.003 
Length -0.001 -0.001 -0.057 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
Settle -0.253* NA 12.407** 0.346 0.319 0.153 
Dsg -0.001 0.013 -0.151 -0.006 0.004 -0.002 
Contagion 
pcSovs 0.319 9.592** 120.687*** 2.927*** 5.235*** 3.827*** 
pcBanks 0.302 -0.806 -2.046 -0.722 1.543 1.531* 
ownBank1 -0.005 0.004 -0.194 0.009 0.001 0.059** 
ownBank2 0.004 NA 0.247 0.016 -0.003 -0.045* 
Other controls 
Prate -0.0169 -4.504** 3.806 0.879 1.115 0.953 
Mrate 0.091 0.423 10.083 0.054 0.230 0.736 
Quarter -0.148 1.986*** 1.439 0.162 -0.658 0.095 
VIX-1 0.012 0.074 1.475** 0.088** 0.107** 0.021 
VIX-2 -0.005 -0.081 -0.876 -0.069** -0.010 -0.043 
USD-1 -1.325 -7.557 228.620* 6.454 12.781 12.092 
USD-2 0.424 5.995 -194.514 -8.693 -14.104* -9.040 
Adj R2 0.955 0.959 0.966 0.995 0.980 0.993 
Note: 287 observations (Greece 62), SUR estimates. Impact of open market operations per billion 
euro. */**/*** denotes significance at the 10/5/1 percent level. 
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Table 7: Impact on sovereign CDS spreads, Lehman phase (15 September 2008 to 21 April 2010) 
 Germany Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain 
AR1 1.073*** 0.991*** 0.759*** 0.968*** 1.006*** 0.816*** 
AR2 -0.138*** -0.075* 0.003 -0.021 -0.038 0.132*** 
ECB open market operations 
Repo -0.002 0.017 0.008 -0.008 -0.004 -0.008 
Repo-1 0.001 -0.012 -0.052 0.006 -0.002 0.000 
Length 0.000 0.008 -0.001 0.004 0.000 0.006* 
Settle -0.148 0.381 102.983*** -1.498 1.141 1.210 
Dsg -0.010 0.130 1.400*** -0.017 -0.001 0.044 
CBPP_ann 1.679 11.071 2.813 1.986 1.910 2.201 
CBPP 0.061 -5.091 -7.884 -2.999 -2.815 -4.163** 
CBPP-1 -0.098 5.508 7.274 3.025 2.872 4.219** 
Contagion 
pcSovs 1.967*** 5.380** 14.543*** 2.535** 1.816* 3.056*** 
pcBanks 0.711 -9.012*** 18.381** -5.179*** -3.450*** -3.494** 
ownBank1 -0.028*** 0.019*** -0.164** 0.021 0.006 0.039 
ownBank2 -0.019** NA 0.124* 0.021 0.003 -0.055 
Other controls 
Prate -6.968*** 9.200 28.336 4.152 5.280 -3.367 
Mrate 6.573*** -9.757 -17.625 -4.056 -4.383 2.684 
Anglo -0.012 13.091 18.977 -0.580 -0.091 -0.847 
Quarter 0.228 4.198 43.900*** 1.970 1.455 -0.928 
VIX-1 0.112*** 0.229 0.901 0.242*** 0.136 0.194** 
VIX-2 -0.108*** -0.216 -0.969* -0.202** -0.210** -0.155* 
USD-1 -11.406 -96.731** -231.385* -42.761* -54.286** -70.959*** 
USD-2 4.317 68.228 296.497** 29.083 40527* 60.025*** 
Adj R2 0.990 0.986 0.897 0.983 0.981 0.964 
Note: 418 observations, SUR estimates. Impact of open market operations per billion euro. */**/*** 
denotes significance at the 10/5/1 percent level. 
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Table 8: Impact on sovereign CDS spreads, euro-crisis phase (22 April 2010 to 1 August 2012) 
 Germany Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain 
AR1 0.866*** 0.719*** 1.139*** 1.094*** 1.097*** 1.072*** 
AR2 0.002 0.257*** -0.214*** -0.164*** -0.166*** -0.134*** 
ECB open market operations 
Repo 0.003 0.549 -0.003 -0.040 -0.105 -0.007 
Repo-1 -0.003 -0.503 0.000 0.051* 0.084 0.024 
Length -0.001 -0.250** 0.001 -0.005 0.008 -0.004 
Settle -0.634 -158.400** -2.293 -3.709 -12.006 -5.301* 
CBPP_ann -0.287 -12.035 4.881 20.548 17.921 7.999 
CBPP2_ann -0.602 -36.824 -15.004 -21.218 -28.194 -4.620 
CBPP -1.618 159.341 -5.753 -7.435 -3.052 -6.315 
CBPP-1 1.253 -169.958 6.439 6.503 -0.583 5.823 
SMP_ann -10.207*** -339.652 -62.639*** -82.717*** -195.415*** -71.071*** 
SMP -0.013 1.465 0.141 -0.042 0.387 0.118 
SMP-5 0.014 1.779 -0.172 -0.006 -0.059 -0.122 
Contagion 
pcSovs -0.096 -49.552 2.101 -2.392 3.788 -2.738 
pcBanks 1.449*** 23.611 0.500 2.156 1.320 0.833 
ownBank1 -0.006 -0.077 0.003 0.001 -0.033* -0.012 
ownBank2 -0.025** -0.035 0.006 -0.005 -0.026 0.003 
Other controls 
Prate 1.998 -88.873 9.655 16.882** 20.176 13.231 
Bailout GR 2.052*** 16.023 -6.393 11.049*** 11.094 9.578** 
Bailout PT -0.708 -19.630 2.017 -2.909 15.546** 2.884 
Bailout IE -1.490** 113.624 8.823* 0.233 23.885*** 1.822 
Bailout SP -1.585** NA -4.360 -0.005 -10.486 -1.819 
Default GR -0.198 NA -3.802 1.108 4.611 0.700 
Quarter 0.026 24.660 -6.981 -6.225 -2.145 -5.894 
VIX-1 0.147** 3.068 0.174 0.178 0.581 -0.117 
VIX-2 -0.163*** -1.703 -0.393 -0.468 -0.998 -0.226 
USD-1 -27.335** -2514.323 -153.188* -120.227* -129.267 -94.563 
USD-2 16.930 2782.045* 206.421** 107.036* 112.267 87.982 
Adj R2 0.961 0.996 0.990 0.989 0.992 0.979 
Note: 595 observations, SUR estimates. Impact of open market operations per billion euro. */**/*** 
denotes significance at the 10/5/1 percent level. 
 
Summary open market operations 
Table 9 provides a summary of the findings just discussed. We code as zero instances when 
there was at most one significant coefficient estimated for the variable in question in the 
respective subsamples. If there were significant negative and positive estimates, we denote 
this by a question mark, unless there were at least two more significant positive (negative) 
coefficient estimates, in which case we report a “+” (“-“). Obviously, if there were only 
significant positive (negative) estimates, this is recorded as a “+” (“-“), too. 
It can be seen that temporary open market operations successfully lowered commercial 
bank CDS spreads during those phases of the crisis when liquidity concerns dominated. Early 
on, sheer volume seems to have mattered, but after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, large 
supply relative to demand and fast settlements were most effective. During the euro crisis, 
however, fast settlement seems to have been taken as a negative signal for sovereigns. 
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For permanent open market operations, we are unable to identify a clear volume effect. 
That said, the announcement of the SMP drove down both commercial bank and sovereign 
CDS spreads, and this massively, by up to 200 basis points. 
 
Table 9: Summary open market operations 
 Pre-crisis (Aug05-Aug07) 
Paribas phase 
(Aug07-Sep08) 
Lehman phase 
(Sep08-Apr10) 
Euro crisis 
(Apr10-Aug12) 
 Banks States Banks States Banks States Banks States 
Temporary open market operations – Repos 
Volume 0 + - 0 ? 0 0 0 
Length + 0 0 0 0 0 ? 0 
Settlement speed 0 0 0 ? + 0 0 - 
Demand-supply gap 0 0 0 0 + 0 NA NA 
Permanent open market operations – Asset purchases 
CBPP announcements NA NA NA NA 0 0 0 0 
CBPP volume NA NA NA NA 0 0 0 0 
SMP announcement NA NA NA NA NA NA - - 
SMP volume NA NA NA NA NA NA 0 0 
Note: We record a zero impact for variables that are significant in at most one equation per subperiod. 
Question marks denote variables for which we found roughly equally many significant positive and negative 
coefficients across banks/sovereigns within one subperiod. 
 
Overall, it is difficult to provide overwhelming evidence of the effectiveness of ECB open 
market operations in reducing CDS spreads throughout the crisis. Repos seem to have 
helped initially, while asset purchases appear to have had no discernible effect. That said, 
we have examined mainly quantitative measures. The finding that the announcement of the 
SMP mattered so much suggests that qualitative measures underlining the ECB’s willingness 
to act may have been more important. Communication also has played an important role in 
the ECB’s attempts to limit contagion, and this is what we turn to next.  
 
5. Contagion 
Since the crisis has spread first from subprime mortgages and banks active in this field to 
broader money markets and then to sovereigns, contagion between financial institutions 
and states has been a major issue since 2007. This section assesses the existence and 
presence of contagion in European CDS spreads. It documents how contagion has spread 
among commercial banks and among sovereigns and examines whether there are linkages 
between the two groups. Special attention is paid to domestic contagion, i.e. from banks 
within one country to that same sovereign, or vice versa.  
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Contagion in commercial bank CDS spreads 
Before the financial crisis, commercial banks’ CDS spreads moved together. Table 1 shows 
for instance that the spread for Commerzbank significantly increased if the day before, the 
first principal of the other commercial banks in our data set had risen. This finding suggests 
that market participants’ doubts about the health of banks spread from one to the other. 
Turning to the first principal component of sovereign CDS spreads, we find for this phase a 
negative impact of sovereign spreads for AIB, Unicredit and Banco Comercial Português. For 
those three banks, we also identify an effect of the own sovereign (positive for AIB and 
Unicredit, negative for BCP). There seems to be no obvious explanation for this pattern. 
In the first phase of the financial crisis, the contagion across commercial banks remains a 
robust finding (Table 2). We now also identify a clear effect of sovereign CDS spreads, with 
higher spreads driving up commercial bank spreads. Presumably, this reflects an effect on 
back of information on the general state of the economy contained in the sovereign CDS 
spread, rather than a direct role of the government’s default probability. The impact of the 
own sovereign CDS spread mitigates this effect for Commerzbank, Alpha Bank and BBVA, but 
strengthens it for Bank of Ireland. 
Contagion between banks seems temporarily less pronounced after the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers, while the common component of sovereign CDS spreads apparently matters for 
banks in all countries but Germany and Portugal. Table 3 shows these results. Again, this 
may be related to the state of the economy reflected in government CDS spreads, though it 
seems likely that over time, the sovereign default probability started to matter directly. In 
Portugal, the sovereign CDS spread seems to have affected banks’ spreads, as was the case 
in Spain. This may reflect that commercial banks hold government bonds on their portfolio, 
which implies a major impact of a sovereign default on banks.  
It is interesting to contrast the findings for Portugal and Spain with the Irish case. For Ireland, 
we find that increases in the Irish sovereign CDS spread seem to have reduced Irish banks’ 
CDS spreads. It seems likely that this is the effect of the bank guarantee made by the Irish 
government on 30 September 2008 and the subsequent capital injections. These measures 
effectively shifted the risk of bankruptcy from the banks to the state. In this connection, it is 
noteworthy that the announcement on 15 January 2009 that Anglo Irish Bank would be 
nationalised does not appear to impact on the Irish bank or sovereign CDS spreads, but that 
it significantly reduces those of both German bank, of Banco Espírito Santo and both Spanish 
banks. It seems probable that this reflects markets’ belief that banks outside Ireland were 
heavily exposed to Anglo and that they were the main beneficiaries of the nationalisation.  
For the phase of the euro crisis, shown in Table 4, we find contagion within the bank group, 
while the impact of the principal component of sovereigns sometimes yields a positive and 
sometime a negative sign. Rises in the own sovereign’s CDS spread drive up CDS spreads of 
Italian and Spanish banks, suggesting clear contagion here. 
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Contagion in sovereign CDS spreads 
Before the crisis, there are few signs of contagion effects both within the group of 
sovereigns and from banks. The Portuguese CDS spread apparently declined if the spread of 
other sovereigns increased, and the Italian CDS spread decreased if the spread of Banca 
Monte di Paschi di Siena rose (Table 5). Then, after the Paribas announcement, there is 
evidence of contagion among sovereigns. For all countries but Germany does Table 6 report 
an increase in CDS spreads a day after the first principal component of the other sovereign 
spreads has risen. This early in the crisis, it seems likely that the effect is due to information 
contained in sovereign CDS spreads on the general state of the economy, and not to 
sovereign default risk. For Spain, there also is a positive impact of the first principal 
component of all banks. The CDS spread of BBVA seems to have had an additional effect in 
the same direction, while the impact of Santander was weaker. 
Table 7 shows that contagion appears to have been pronounced in the phase after the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers. The first principal component of sovereign CDS spreads is 
significant for all countries. This may reflect contagion through real trade links, but it may 
also mirror the realisation that the rescue measures taken by individual countries or the 
Troika would have cross-border effects on government finances.  
The effect of bank spreads is unclear. The Irish CDS spread apparently increased if 
commercial bank spreads rose (with the effect being even stronger for AIB but weaker for 
Bank of Ireland), while the sovereign CDS spreads in the other euro-crisis countries tended 
to decline when bank spreads across Europe rose. Moreover, the German sovereign CDS 
spread apparently moved in the opposite direction from that of the German commercial 
banks, while increases in the spread of Alpha Bank seems to have driven up further the 
Greek sovereign CDS spread. 
Finally, during the euro crisis there seems to have been little contagion among sovereign 
CDS spreads. We only find three significant coefficients in Table 8, one showing a positive 
impact of bank spreads on the German CDS spread, one of Deutsche Bank (with a negative 
sign) also on the German spread and one of Banco Comercial Português on the Portuguese 
sovereign spread (also with a negative sign). It is surprising at first glance to find so little 
evidence of contagion during the euro area debt crisis. However, it is possible that the ECB’s 
asset purchases under the SMP were successful in breaking the contagion links that had 
manifested themselves in the Lehman phase. 
Summary contagion 
Table 10 summarises the findings on contagion. We find contagion from banks to banks in all 
subsamples but the Lehman phase, and from sovereigns to sovereigns in the Paribas and 
Lehman phase. During those two subsamples, banks also responded to the principal 
component of sovereign CDS spreads, which probably captured information on the state of 
the economy in general. In the opposite direction, there is no evidence of contagion from 
banks to sovereigns. If anything, we find that sovereign CDS spreads decline in the Lehman 
sample when bank CDS spreads rise.  
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The evidence on domestic contagion is mixed. Regarding the impact of the own sovereign 
CDS spread, we find that it tends to offset the effect of the first principal component during 
the Paribas phase. Thereafter, a higher domestic sovereign CDS spread has tended to 
increase the spread of domestic banks in Italy, Portugal and Spain. This may reflect the 
presence of government bonds in those banks’ portfolios, or the worry that constrained 
government finances imply less room for rescue measures and a higher default probability 
of banks. In Ireland, where the state took over large parts of the banking system, bank 
spreads by contrast declined as the sovereign CDS spread increased. 
 
Table 10: Summary contagion 
 Pre-crisis (Aug05-Aug07) 
Paribas phase 
(Aug07-Sep08) 
Lehman phase 
(Sep08-Apr10) 
Euro crisis 
(Apr10-Aug12) 
 Banks States Banks States Banks States Banks States 
Contagion from banks + 0 + 0 0 - + 0 
Contagion from states - 0 + + + + ? 0 
Domestic contagion ? 0 - ? +1) ? + - 
Note: We record a zero impact for variables that are significant in at most one equation per subperiod. 
Question marks denote variables for which we found roughly equally many significant positive and negative 
coefficients across banks/sovereigns within one subperiod. 1) Negative impact for Irish banks. 
 
The most striking finding in Table 10 is that sovereign CDS spreads do not appear to respond 
to one another and to stress in the banking system during the euro crisis phase. This is 
surprising given the scale and spread of this crisis. However, it may reflect that the ECB used 
SMP purchases as a means of preventing problems in one country from spilling over to other 
countries and thus successfully stopped contagion. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper examines euro area CDS spreads during the financial crisis. CDS data allow us to 
analyse how the crisis affected both commercial banks, which were at the centre of 
attention in 2007 to 2009, and sovereigns, to which the focus has shifted since.  
We try to answer to two questions. First, how effective have the ECB open market 
operations been in reducing CDS spreads and thus markets’ expectations about the default 
probability of banks and sovereigns? And second, how important has contagion among and 
between banks and sovereigns been? 
For the open market operations, we find that in the early part of the crisis, large repo 
volumes, both in absolute terms and relative to demand, as well as speedy settlement 
helped reduce commercial bank CDS spreads. Since the beginning of the euro crisis, only the 
announcement of the Securities Market Programme has had a clear-cut effect in bringing 
down both bank and sovereign CDS spreads. 
We detect contagion among banks in three of our four subsamples, and contagion among 
sovereigns in the aftermath of the collapse of Lehman Brothers. During that period, there 
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also is evidence that increasing sovereign CDS spreads have tended to raise bank spreads. 
Arguably, the most interesting finding on contagion is, however, that sovereign CDS spreads 
have appeared immune to general movements in bank spreads and in the spreads of other 
sovereigns since the onset of the euro crisis. This may indicate that the ECB asset purchases 
have successively prevented contagion. 
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